Firmware compromises are starting to make their way into the mainstream news media and are expected to proliferate in the wild. Oded (PrivateCore’s CEO) prognosticated in an post in early January that cybercriminals would learn from the very skilled NSA ANT technologists to manipulate firmware in their effort to make illicit profits. Others now share that view.
In reading yesterday’s New York Times, I came across an article based on CrowdStrike threat research that included the quote, “As security software becomes more prolific, hackers continue to make their way down the food chain to computer hardware where it is much more difficult to identify and remove.”
The details behind security breaches take time to make their way into the news. I expect that we will eventually read about firmware compromises in the future, but it will take some time before such breach details make their way into the media.
While compromised hardware and firmware might be difficult to identify, that is the hard problem that PrivateCore has focused on since our founding in 2011. New threats require new countermeasures. Hardware and firmware attacks call for a new layer of defense, and PrivateCore provides that layer of defense. If you are an enterprise IT security concerned about trusted computing for your servers, you should take PrivateCore vCage software for a spin.
Happy New Year and welcome to 2014! We are off to a rip-roaring start with news of the NSA’s exploit techniques. Following on Der Spiegel’s revelations about the US National Security Agency (NSA) Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group, the new year brought with it news of specific tools used by the NSA Advanced Network Technology (ANT) division detailed in the catalog of exploits described by Der Spiegel and Wired.
While there is not much enterprises can do to counter the NSA going after a specific target (if they want your sensitive data, they will find a way to get it), the more worrisome issue is the criminal community digesting the news and learning from the masters of system penetration. You can expect that techniques described in the NSA ANT catalog will soon be used by the hacker community to create similar exploits.
As mentioned in Todd’s earlier blog post, the NSA technologists have designed their exploits for persistence and use the system BIOS as a launching pad. These bootkits (referred to as “software implants” in the NSA catalog) are the first thing to load when a system starts and can lock themselves into a privileged background process called “System Management Mode” (SMM) from which they can passively inspect data, or actively inject payloads into the running operating system or hypervisor. Some examples of the NSA persistent software implant approach include:
IRATEMONK infects the firmware on a common HDD controller, and performs a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack to inject code into the Master-Boot-Record (MBR) of the system on the fly at boot time.
I founded PrivateCore knowing that these sorts of weaknesses existed in today’s computing infrastructure, and anticipating that hackers will take advantage of these weakness to gain data access and system control. Now that the NSA catalog is out in the open, we have evidence that indeed these weaknesses are being exploited in the wild.
PrivateCore vCage counters all of the BIOS threats to servers described in the NSA catalog. Why can I make such a broad claim? We protect servers with some foundation technology: validating the integrity of x86 servers with remote attestation to counter BIOS infection trying to fly under the radar. We follow the motto of “verify then trust” when it comes server integrity. Infected BIOS? Infected MBR? We’ve got our eyes on you! This video describes how PrivateCore vCage does this in an OpenStack environment.
The NSA ANT catalog is dated 2008 so how come we never heard about a breach using these exploits? If I would have to guess, the NSA has been very diligent in using these tools in a pin-point fashion to go after specific targets. Criminals on the other hand, will not be as discriminating or precise, and you should expect more widespread use of these techniques.
While techniques described in the NSA ANT catalog were previously in the realm of well-funded state actors, you can expect them to come to a server near you as they become commonplace tools of criminal actors. Verifying (rather than taking for granted) the integrity of your compute infrastructure and having measures in place to counter these sorts of persistent threats will enable you to have a better night’s sleep in 2014.